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Case Summaries
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Andrews v. Veterans Administration, 838 F.2d 418
The president of the union local representing nurses employed at
the Veterans Administration (VA) Medical Center requested copies of
proficiency reports for all registered nurses at the center. Appellees, all
registered nurses at the center, brought an action seeking to enjoin the
VA from releasing these personnel records in an improperly sanitized
condition, and sought damages, citing an intentional and willful viola-
tion of the Privacy Act of 1974. The district court found that the VA
erred in failing to balance the interest of the parties prior to disclosure
and found the nurses' privacy interests were substantial and the union's
interest in obtaining the documents was minimal. Reversed.
The Tenth Circuit held that even if the Privacy Act is violated, no
punishment may be imposed unless the agency acts in a manner that is
intentional or willful, and the action is so patently egregious and unlaw-
ful that anyone undertaking the conduct should have known it to be un-
lawful. Applying this standard, the VA's conduct fell short of not only a
willful or deliberate standard, but also the gross negligence standard
applied by the district-court.
Brock v. R.J. Auto Parts and Service Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 677
Appellant Department of Labor appeals a district court decision dis-
missing its cause of action against the appellee as a discovery sanction.
Reversed and remanded.
The Department of Labor brought suit against R.J. Auto Parts
under the Fair Labor Standards Act for violations of minimum wage,
overtime, and record keeping provisions. During discovery, R.J. Auto
Parts requested the names of all the individuals who had made com-
plaints to the Dept. of Labor. When the Dept. failed to provide these
names, the district court dismissed the action. In reversing, the court of
appeals noted that R.J. Auto Parts demonstrated no need for such a list,
and that absent this showing of need, the Deptartment of Labor was not
required to prematurely identify the witnesses it was planning to call at
trial.
Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs v. Kaiser Steel Corporation,
860 F.2d 377
The Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977 liberalized eligibility
requirements. The Act provided that if a miner had been denied bene-
fits prior to March 1, 1978, he could reapply to have his eligibility deter-
mined under new criteria. The burden of paying benefits to such miners
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was shifted from the employer to the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund.
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) relied on affidavits from a claimant
and transferred liability from the claimant's employer to the Fund.
Finding that the transfer of liability was in error because there was no
record of an earlier claim, the Director modified the ALJ's ruling. After
a hearing, a new ALJ ruled that the Director had no authority to modify
the previous decision.
The Tenth Circuit held that under 33 U.S.C. § 922, the Director is
without authority to modify a compensation order for any mistaken de-
terminations of fact other than his own. Since the ALJ made the mis-
take, and not the Director, there was no authority to modify the order.
Gatson v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 379
Plaintiff, who had originally been denied social security benefits,
brought suit and won the right to those benefits. In this action, plaintiff
brought suit under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412, to recover her attorney's costs from the previous action.
On appeal, the court of appeals held that the EAJA standard to re-
cover litigation costs from the United States had been met by the plain-
tiff. The court held that the Social Security Administration's total
reliance upon the Administrative LawJudge's application of a subjective
pain evaluation test was not substantially justifed.
Hill v. Department of Air Force, 844 F.2d 1407
On appeal, defendant-appellant argues that the district court erred
in granting appellee's motion for a preliminary injunction ordering ap-
pellant to restore appellee's security clearance and prohibiting appellant
from releasing information on appellee's suitability for a security
clearance.
The panel concluded that the district court improperly based its ju-
risdiction on constitutional grounds and evaluated the merits of the ap-
pellant's actions with respect to appellee's security clearance on those
grounds. Based on Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 108 S. Ct. 818 (1988), fed-
eral courts have no authority to review the merits of the grant or denial
of security clearances; instead, these matters are within the discretion of
the appropriate agency of the Executive Branch.
The panel found that the court did have general jurisdiction to re-
view whether agency procedures were followed, but had no power to
order a reinstatement of appellee's clearance or to grant the additional
relief contained in the preliminary injunction granted to appellee.
Moreover, the panel held that a further review of the procedures fol-
lowed in suspending appellee's clearance and of the agency's refusal to
continue to adjudicate the matter following appellee's removal for mis-
conduct is unnecessary and inappropriate. The case is remanded to the
district court with instructions to dissolve the preliminary injunction.
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Johansen v. The City of Bartlesville, 862 F.2d 1423
Appellants appeal the dismissal of their civil rights claims brought
under 42 U.S.C. § § 1983 and 1985(3). Appellants in district court al-
leged violation of rights to due process and equal protection due to in-
adequate notice of a meeting at which a rezoning settlement agreement
was approved by less than the super majority vote required by statute.
After the district court dismissed the case below, appellants were given
adequate notice of and attended a meeting at which the rezoning of the
property was approved by the requisite super majority vote. Subsequent
to that meeting, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals invalidated the zoning
change due in part to insufficient notice of the initial meeting. Address-
ing the issue of mootness, the Tenth Circuit held that appellants' claims
fail to survive the test of mootness since this is not a class action and
appellants fail to meet the two-part test of (1) a challenged action of
duration too short to permit full litigation and (2) that there be a reason-
able expectation that the same party will again be subjected to the same
action. Here, there was full litigation of all matters and the court found
nothing in the record to indicate that appellants had any reasonable ex-
pectation of a recurring controversy to which they would be parties.
The court also held that appellants were not entitled to punitive
damages because they failed to meet the Rule 12(b)(6) threshold test of
proving any facts to support a section 1983 claim entitling them to re-
lief. Appellants' mere allegations of due process and equal protection
violations are not sufficient to substantiate the required evil motive or
intent or reckless indifference that underlie punitive damages.
Vacated and remanded for dimissal on mootness.
Mustang Energy Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm 'n. (FERC), 859
F.2d 1447
Appellant Mustang petitions for review of orders of the FERC es-
tablishing "fair and equitable" rates for the transportation of natural
gas. At issue is the FERC's determination of "fair and equitable" rates
for intrastate transportation service. Affirmed in part, modified in part.
Mustang is an intrastate pipeline, transporting natural gas in
Oklahoma. In 1981, Mustang entered into a Transportation Agreement
with El Paso Natural Gas Company. The agreement provided for the
initial transportation rate to be charged, and for any subsequent rate
changes to be submitted to the FERC for approval. The agreement also
included a "minimum bill" provision, wherby El Paso was required to
pay for the transportation of a "minimum daily quantity" whether or not
that volume was actually transported. On Septmeber 30, 1982, and
again on May 23, 1983, Mustang filed a petition for approval of trans-
portation rate increases. Both increases were collected from El Paso,
subject to refund upon any disapproval by the FERC at the rate review
proceeedings. On June 4, 1985, the FERC issued an order setting fair
and equitable rates to be charged by Mustang which were below those
1989] 669
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requested. In addition, the FERC invalidated the minimum bill provi-
sion and ordered Mustang to make refund payments to El Paso.
Mustang appealed, alleging that (1) the rates approved by the FERC
were not fair and equitable, (2) elimination of the minimmum bill provi-
sion was not fair and equitable, (3) the FERC applied an improper meth-
odology in reaching a fair and equitable transportation rate, (4) the
refund was improperly ordered, and (5) the FERC's procedures denied
Mustang due process of law. The court determined that under the stat-
ute, the transportation rate is fair and equitable if it is initially con-
structed to recover costs and allow for a profit. The risk of financial
losses resulting from any variance from design projections and underu-
tilization must be upon the intrastate pipeline. Accordingly, the rate or-
dered by the FERC was fair and equitable. FERC's use of actual cost
data was also determined to be a proper methodology for determining
transportation rates. However, the FERC's selective use of the actual
cost data was deemed arbitrary and as a result the case is remanded.
Republic Airlines v. United States Dep' of Transportation, 849 F.2d 1315
Plaintiff airlines are seeking to overturn a decision by the Civil Aer-
onautics Board (CAB) refusing to apply recaptured subsidy overpay-
ments for 1982-83 to their unmet "need" requirements of Federal
Aviation Act section 406(b), (which provided federal subsidies to airlines
flying unprofitable routes). The airlines would have to refund any tax
subsidies paid which were in excesss of actual liabilities at year's end.
Plaintiffs are seeking to have such refunds applied against unmet need
created by congressional appropriation limitations.
As part of the process of airline deregulation, Congress substan-
tially amended and then terminated the airline subsidy program, limit-
ing in the process the CAB's authority to pay subsidies for 1982 and
prohibiting subsidies for fiscal 1983. The Tenth Circuit held that the
CAB's refusal to apply overpayment refunds to unmet "need" of section
406(b) was in accord with law, and not an arbitrary or capricious abuse
of discretion.
Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068
A Utah County planned to widen a road to accommodate more traf-
fic through scenic wilderness and park lands. The Sierra Club sued the
Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior, the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) and the county for an injunction, asserting
that: (1) the county's proposed improvement would extend the roadway
beyond the existing right-of-way; (2) such extension would encroach on
federal land without the approval of the BLM as required; (3) the im-
provements will degrade the adjacent wilderness; and (4) the BLM vio-
lated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) by failing
to study the environmental impact of the construction. The district
court enjoined the county's project pending trial, after which it author-
ized the construction. The court found that all but a portion of the con-
670 [Vol. 66:4
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struction would not extend beyond the present right-of-way. For the
portion extending beyond, the court required that the county seek a
Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA) permit. Furthermore,
the court ordered the BLM to conduct studies in order to locate and
preserve plant life and archaeological sites. The court denied county's
request for damages resulting from construction delays. Both sides
appealed.
The Tenth Circuit addressed the following jurisdictional issues: (1)
whether BLM's refusal to act under FLPMA was committed to agency
discretion and therefore exempt from judicial review and (2) whether or
not the Sierra Club has rights of action against BLM and the county.
The court also addressed the following issues: (1) whether and to what
extent the county's plans fall within the existing right-of-way; (2)
whether and to what extent the plans affect adjacent wilderness areas;
(3) whether and to what extent major federal action as defined in NEPA
is involved by BLM's activities or responsibilities under FLPMA; and (4)
whether and to what extent BLM must conduct further environmental
studies under NEPA. Last, the court addressed the validity of the dis-
trict court's decision to: (1) order the county to apply for a permit to
relocate part of the road; (2) make the BLM conduct an inventory of
plant life along the trail; and (3) deny the county damages of the con-
struction delays.
On the jurisdictional issues, the court held that Congress has pro-
vided applicable law in the form of standards imposed on BLM via
FLPMA and therefore BLM's refusal to act is judicially reviewable; and
Plaintiff may sue BLM under section 702 of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act which permits actions against an agency even when no implied
right of action exists and Plaintiff may also sue the county since under
F.R.C.P. 19 the county would have been joined anyway as a third-party
defendant. Regarding the issues pertaining to the merits of the case, the
court held that: (1) the county's plans fell within the parameters of the
existing right-of-way; (2) unless the BLM moves for reconsideration
based on a showing of the road's degradation of adjacent wilderness
areas, the district court's order will stand; (3) major federal action as
defined in NEPA is involved by BLM's activities under FLPMA and that
BLM has the duty to determine if there are less degrading alternatives
and impose them if so; and (4) that BLM on remand must issue an envi-
ronmental assessment and either a finding of no significant impact or an
environmental impact statement. Regarding the denial of damages, the
Tenth Circuit held that Sierra Club's claims had high public interest and
were litigated in good faith, thus making the denial of damages within
the district court's discretion.
Texaco Producing Co. v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 776
Appellant Texaco appeals a district court order upholding a deci-
sion by the Interior Board of Land Appeals to vacate a prior approval to
drill in a national forest. Affirmed.
1989]
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In affirming, the court of appeals noted that a failure to consider a
"no action" alternative in the original environmental impact statement
warranted the preparation of a supplemental environmental impact
statement.
Torix v. Ball Corporation, 862 F.2d 1428
Appellant applied for, and was denied, disability benefits under a
pension plan organized by appellee corporation under the provisions of
the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982). After administrative review of the denial,
appellant filed this action. The district court granted judgment for the
appellees, finding that appellant failed to sustain his burden of showing
that the Plan's Pension and Insurance Committee had proceeded
improperly.
On appeal, the panel followed the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit
as expressed in Helms v. Monsanto Co., 728 F.2d 1416 (11th Cir. 1984),
and held that a reasonable interpretation of a claimant's entitlement to
payment based on a claim of "total disability" must consider the claim-
ant's ability to pursue gainful employment in light of all the circum-
stances. The panel instructed that the standard to be applied will
require the claimant to establish a physical inability to follow any occu-
pation from which the claimant can earn a reasonable income. Although
the income may be less than the amount earned prior to the disability,
the panel specified that the earnings possible must rise to the dignity of
a livelihood. The panel stated that if appellant meets this burden, he
may not be denied recovery based on overly restrictive interpretation of
the plan's language. Because the committee may have used an unduly
restrictive interpretation of the plan's provisions to deny an award of
benefits, the panel reversed and remanded the case for a new trial.
Twin Pines Coal Company v. United States Department of Labor, 854 F.2d
1212
In this appeal the Twin Pines Coal Company (Twin Pines) chal-
lenges the Benefits Review Board's decision affirming the grant of Black
Lung Benefits to Charles L. White, an employee.
Twin Pines was assessed liability for black lung benefits by the De-
partment of Labor. They challenge on four grounds: First, because
White already receives total disability benefits from the Social Security
Administration and the State of Colorado, he cannot also receive total
disability benefits under the black lung program. Second, the interim
regulations under which White was awarded benefits had expired and
were thus improperly invoked by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
Third, the interim presumption was improperly invoked on the basis of
a doctor's study of White. Finally, the determination that White is to-
tally disabled due to pneumoconiosis is not supported by medical
evidence.
[Vol. 66:4
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The Tenth Circuit held that the ALJ failed to consider adequately
the doctor's opinion. Moreover, the court held that miners who are
disabled due to pneumoconiosis whether or not they are disabled from a
different cause may still claim benefits.
The court rejected the argument that the case was wrongfully adju-
dicated because the ALJ applied the interim regulations, rather than the
final regulations. The court held that the requirement that final regula-
tions be published within six months does not require that the final reg-
ulations become effective six months after the passage of amendments.
The court concluded that the ALJ failed to consider the doctor's opinion
before determining whether invocation of the interim regulations based
on the qualifying ventilatory study was proper. The court remanded the
case to the Benefits Review Board.

